CubaBrief: The case for sanctions and against the Castro dictatorship in Cuba

The Castro dictatorship’s annual campaign at the UN General Assembly blaming the U.S. embargo for the island’s misery is a decades-old alibi that collapses under scrutiny: Cuba is poor because it is not free, its communist system monopolizes the economy, starves private enterprise, pours scarce resources into hotels while rationing food, and sits on billions in military-held assets while citizens lack medicine and power.  As detailed in Roberto González’s October 21, 2026 Miami Herald op-ed “Cuba is, again, drumming up opposition to U.S. embargo. It’s all based on lies,” John Suarez’s August 26, 2025 Washington Times piece “Sanctions against Cuba work,” Nora Gámez Torres’s August 6, 2021 Miami Herald analysis, and U.S. Ambassador Mike Waltz’s full UN General Assembly speech (https://youtu.be/AfQpvjcWzL4), the embargo is secondary; the real blockade is internal—no free press, no accountability, no elections—and the evidence shows U.S. food reaches Cubans while the dictatorship prioritizes control and elite enrichment over Cuban’s welfare.

 

U.S. – Cuba trade 2000 – 2024, Source: U.S. Census Bureau

In his 1999 novel The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, Czech writer Milan Kundera observed that “the struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.” Memory provides context for unfolding events today and helps us make informed judgments. Amid the current debates, this is an opportune moment to revisit how U.S. sanctions came into existence, as well as some of the Cuban dictator’s observations on the U.S. embargo on Cuba during its first three decades.

Thirty years of Fidel Castro claiming U.S sanctions were unimportant

Havana claims that the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba over the past sixty seven years has cost the Cuban dictatorship $1.499 trillion, but that was not what the regime, and their maximum leader, said during the first 30 years of the Cuban dictatorship. Here are some of the statements made by Fidel Castro between the 1964 through 2000 related to the economic embargo.

“We are going to have, within ten years, a milk production higher than the Netherlands and a cheese production higher than France. That is the great goal that we propose to achieve. By that date we think that the amount of 30 million liters of milk will be exceeded. So there will be to export … you can imagine.” said Fidel Castro, in an interview with Eddy Martin from the official Hoy newspaper on March 2, 1964.

“The great battle of the eggs has been won. From now on the people will be able to have sixty million eggs each month,” said Fidel Castro in a speech on January 2, 1965.

“In 1970 the Island will have 5,000 experts in the cattle industry and around 8 million cows and calves that will be good milk producers” ….  “There will be so much milk that the Bay of Havana will be able to be filled with milk,” said Fidel Castro in his December 1966 speech during the Assembly of the Federation of Cuban Women, a mass organization of the dictatorship.

Fidel Castro, speaking at the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in December 1975 bragged about the unimportance of economic sanctions saying,“at first (the United States) their cancellations were quite annoying … but when luckily, we did not depend on them for anything, neither in trade, nor in supplies, nor in anything. If we are already victorious now, after victory, what can they threaten us with? With canceling what … what? ”

“The United States has less and less to offer Cuba. If we could export our products to the United States, we would have to start making plans for new production lines … because everything that we produce now and everything that we are going to produce in the next five years has already been sold to other markets. We should deprive other socialist countries of these products in order to sell them to the United States. But the socialist countries pay us much better prices and have much better relations with us than we have with the United States. There is a popular saying that goes: ‘Don’t trade a cow for a goat.’” said Fidel Castro in his interview with Playboy published in April 1985

“Cuba will not buy an aspirin or a grain of rice. They have put a lot of restrictions (on the permission to sell food and medicine) that make it humiliating for the country, but also make it impossible in practice,” said Fidel Castro, in front of the United States Interests Office, in Havana, Cuba on October 18, 2000.

Fidel Castro had a point. Cuba’s existential economic crisis was and is not due to the embargo. The Castro regime would go on to purchase billions in American agricultural products between 2000 and the present, but to do so they defaulted on what they owed to others. The peak year of trade between Cuba and the United States was in 2025, the last full year on record of the the Trump Administration.

Nevertheless food security has not improved, nor was it better during the Biden Administration.

The 2024 bread shortage in Cuba

Flour was scarce in Cuba in 2024.

Havana on March 4, 2024 confirmed it had sought help from the World Food Program to guarantee the supply of subsidized powdered milk for children. On February 24, 2024 Emerio Gonzalez Lorenzo, president of the “Grupo Empresarial de la Industria Alimentaria” (GEIA) [Food Industry Business Group] which is under the Cuban government’s “Ministerio de la Industria Alimenticia” (MINAL) [ Ministry of the Food Industry ] announced that “there is little bread in Cuba due to a lack of flour,”  and that this situation would continue until the end of March 2024.

Official press channels made no mention of the “25,000 tons of wheat donated by the Russian government that arrived in mid-January” 2024 which “exceeds the 20,000 tons that, authorities assured [on February 24th], are necessary to cover the rationed daily bread rolls for a month. If this is the case, the shipment of Russian wheat should have been enough to supply the stores for the remainder of this month and the next”, reported 14ymedio.

The suspension of bread from the ration book in 2024, announced by Havana, was not due to U.S. sanctions as the Cuban dictatorship claims.

The shortage of bread is due to the fact that of the five mills to turn wheat to flour in Cuba, only the one currently operational is in Cienfuegos. There is no shortage of wheat, but of flour due to the Cuban government’s monopoly over the means of production, and its inefficiency, and corruption.

This is compounded by the regime’s track record of giving priority for supplies of flour for tourists in luxury hotels, compared to the hunger of Cuban families who also suffer blackouts, piles of garbage on corners with infestations of mice, mosquitoes and cockroaches, plus sewage leaks and lack of drinking water.

The US State Department in its 2025 fact sheet on the “Provision of Humanitarian Assistance to Cuba” clearly states: “While the embargo remains in place, the U.S. government prioritizes support for the Cuban people, and U.S. law and regulations include exemptions and authorizations relating to exports of food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods to Cuba, as well as disaster response.”

Press accounts of the U.S. Embargo on Cuba do not mention how it saved American taxpayers from joining their Canadian, Chinese, European, and Russian counterparts in paying off bad debt by the Cuban government. Nor do they discuss the circumstances that drove the United States to impose an embargo on Havana.

How the U.S. embargo on Cuba came to be imposed

U.S. policy towards Cuba has not been static since January 1, 1959 but has been changing and driven by various interests, including U.S. national interests. There is a lot of disinformation about how the U.S. Embargo was first imposed on Cuba, and how and why the U.S. broke diplomatic relations with Havana. Here is a brief breakdown of what happened.

Fidel Castro overthrew the Fulgencio Batista regime on January 1, 1959 following a U.S. arms embargo being imposed on the military dictator in the spring of 1958. The United States had actively pressured Batista to leave office since 1958. On January 7, 1959 the United States recognized the new Cuban government ushered in by the Castro brothers. It took just seven days to recognize the new regime.

In comparison it had taken the United States 17 days to recognize the government of Fulgencio Batista following his March 10, 1952 coup. The United States had not been consulted ahead of time about Batista’s plans and this led to the delay in recognition.

In April 1959 Fidel Castro visited the United States on an eleven day trip that concluded with a three hour meeting with Vice President Richard Nixon on April 19, 1959.

Within nine months of U.S. recognition of the revolutionary government in Cuba the new regime began targeting American interests on the island, allying itself with the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and plotting the overthrow of several Latin American governments.

It is important to revisit how the embargo was first imposed, and why it remains relevant today.

  • Fidel Castro visits Caracas on January 23, 1959 and meets with Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt, a social democrat, “to enlist cooperation and financial backing for ‘the master plan against the gringos.’”
  • On March 3, 1959 the Castro regime expropriates properties belonging to the International Telephone and Telegraph Company, and took over its affiliate, the Cuban Telephone Company.
  • On May 17, 1959 the government expropriated farm lands over 1,000 acres and banned land ownership by foreigners.
  • Havana beginning in 1959 sent armed expeditions to Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic to overthrow their governments.
  • On February 6, 1960 talks began publicly between the U.S.S.R and Fidel Castro. The Soviet Union agreed to buy five million tons of sugar over five years. They also agreed to support Cuba with oil, grain, and credit.
  • On July 6, 1960 the Castro regime passed a nationalization law authorizing nationalization of U.S.- owned property through expropriation. Texaco, Esso, and Shell oil refineries were taken.

The Eisenhower Administration reduced the sugar quote for Cuba on July 6, 1960 by 700 tons.

The Eisenhower State Department in response to the above actions imposed the first trade embargo on Cuba on October 19, 1960, and it “covered all U.S. exports to Cuba except for medicine and some foods.” This did not alter Havana’s behavior.

  • On November 19, 1960 Ernesto “Che” Guevara heading a Cuban delegation in Beijing met with Mao Zedong between 4:20pm and 6:30pm and discussed revolutionary objectives in Latin America.

On December 16, 1960 the sugar quota by the United States for Cuba was reduced to zero.

The last straw: When the limit was reached, and diplomatic relations severed

Tens of thousands of Cubans were lined up outside of the U.S. embassy in Havana seeking visas to flee the communist dictatorship, and this became a source of embarrassment for the communist regime. Fidel Castro communicated with the Eisenhower Administration on January 3, 1961 and demanded the expulsion of 67 U.S. diplomats, within 48 hours, reducing their number to 11, the same number at the Cuban embassy in Washington DC. The Americans had over 50,000 visa applications to process when the ultimatum was delivered.

On January 3, 1961 at 8:30 p.m. EST President Eisenhower issued a statement stating: “There is a limit to what the United States in self respect can endure. That limit has now been reached,” and severed diplomatic relations with Cuba.

President John Fitzgerald Kennedy took office on January 20, 1961.

A year later, between January 22, 1962 to January 31, 1962 the Kennedy Administration successfully lobbied the Foreign Ministers of the member countries of the Organization of American States (OAS) to expel Cuba from the regional body.

The U.S. embargo was expanded and formalized on February 3, 1962.

On February 3, 1962 President John F. Kennedy declared in Proclamation 3447 an “Embargo on All Trade with Cuba” in which it was “resolved that the present Government of Cuba is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the Inter-American system; and, in light of the subversive offensive of Sino-Soviet Communism with which the Government of Cuba is publicly aligned, urged the member states to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual and collective self-defense.”

On July 26, 1964 the OAS imposed multilateral sanctions on Cuba and member states broke relations with Havana throughout the Western Hemisphere, with Mexico the only country maintaining relations with Havana at the time.

Warming of relations between Washington and Havana did not begin until the tail end of the Nixon Administration, following the start of detente with China and the Soviet Union. Nixon traveled to China in February 1972 and met with Mao Zedong dropping opposition to Beijing’s entry to the United Nations, and in May 1972 Nixon traveled to the Soviet Union and met with Leonid Breshnev and supported a nuclear arms agreement. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had laid the groundwork for both meetings, and the overall detente.

In 1973 Henry Kissinger assumed the position of Secretary of State while also retaining his position as National Security Advisor in the Nixon Administration, and began to explore the possibility of a detente with Fidel Castro. Nestor T. Carbonell, in his important 2020 book Why Cuba Matters: New Threats in America’s Backyard, describes what happened next.

“Cuba remained a controversial political issue in the United States, so Kissinger guardedly looked for an intermediary to make initial contacts with the Castro regime (as President Kennedy had done with journalist Lisa Howard following the Missile Crisis). The choice this time was Frank Mankiewicz, a freelance journalist and former spokesman for Robert Kennedy who had recently shot a documentary on Cuba for CBS and was returning to Havana to interview Castro…” According to Kissinger, Nixon was not enthusiastic about the emissary, but he went along with a message to Castro along these lines: “America in principle was prepared to improve relations [with Cuba] on the basis of reciprocal measures agreed in confidential discussions … and was willing to show our goodwill by making symbolic first moves.”

Fidel Castro responded to the outreach with Mankiewicz with a box of Cuban cigars for Kissinger and a message expressing interest in “relaxing tensions” – the definition of détente. In the meantime, Watergate led to the early departure of Nixon from the White House on August 9, 1974 and Gerald Ford, his vice president, replacing him. [However, Kissinger continued with both positions through November 3, 1975, and as Secretary of State until the end of the Ford Administration on January 20, 1977.]

“A preliminary meeting was held on January 11, 1975, at a cafeteria in New York, by Deputy Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger with two Castro representatives: Ramón Sánchez Parodi, a senior official of the Cuban Communist Party, and Néstor García, first secretary of Cuba’s UN mission. This was followed by a substantive discussion on July 9 at the Pierre Hotel in Manhattan, led by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs William Rogers, who covered some of the steps approved by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to relax tensions, phase out the embargo, and normalize relations. […]

“Eager to clinch a deal with Castro, the Ford administration offered several inducements to the Cuban ruler without any quid pro quo. First, the United States voted in favor of the July 29, 1975, OAS resolution, effectively ending the multilateral diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Castro regime. Then on August 19, President Ford eased the US embargo, allowing foreign subsidiaries of US companies to trade with Cuba, dropping foreign aid penalties on countries trading with the island, and permitting ships en route to Cuba to refuel in the United States.”

The hoped for “easing of tensions” did not occur, but instead the Ford Administration ended up with egg on its face.

Castro’s response was to send thousands of Cuban troops to Africa, first to Angola. According to the [Department of State Bulletin Volume 89 – February 1989] On September 23, 1975 “Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared that events in Angola had taken a ‘distressing turn’ and that the United States was ‘most alarmed at the interference of extracontinental powers,’ i.e., the Soviet Union and Cuba.” [ Cubans had been there since at least March 1975]

All pretense that Cuba only had an advisory role was dropped on November 5, 1975, [Department of State Bulletin Volume 89 – February 1989] when thousands of Cuban troops were fighting in Angola; by February 1976, the number had increased to an estimated 14,000.” Cuban involvement in Angola would continue until 1991.

Kissinger was so angered by the Cuban intervention in Angola, and the failure of detente that he entertained the idea of air strikes on Cuba.

This pattern of opening up to the Castro regime with unilateral concessions, legitimizing it internationally, providing it more resources, followed by negative consequences was established by Henry Kissinger during the Nixon and Ford Administrations and would be repeated on greater scale by the Carter, Clinton, Obama, and Biden Administrations over the next five decades.

To understand the US embargo, it is important to understand the internal blockade

Afro-Cuban American scholar, Amalia Dache, an associate professor in the Higher Education Division at the University of Pennsylvania who “engages in research within contested urban geographies, including Havana, Cuba; Cape Town, South Africa; and Ferguson, Missouri” explained in July 21, 2021 the reality of the US embargo and the Castro regime’s internal blockade.

“No. It’s very hard for me to say that as someone who still has family living in Cuba. But lifting the embargo would not magically improve their lives. Here’s why: To understand the US embargo, it’s important to know about the internal blockade the Cuban government imposes on its own people. For example, the US embargo does still allow for food and medicine sales to Cuba. The Cuban government buys $100 million worth of chicken from producers in the United States annually. It sells that chicken to the Cuban people at a marked-up rate, sometimes at double the cost, and uses the profit to fund the regime. Other countries trade freely with Cuba, but because the government is heavily involved, the internal blockade keeps those profits from reaching the Cuban people. Poor neighborhoods — Afro Cuban neighborhoods — get the worst of the shortages. The police and military get money for new cars and surveillance technology.”

The dictatorship in Cuba is also a kleptocracy, pleading poverty while hoarding $18 billion in the coffers of the Cuban military’s conglomerate GAESA. The profits do not reach the average Cuban but instead go to regime elites—beginning with Fidel Castro and continuing today with his great-grandnephew, Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro—who lived (and continue to live) lives of great wealth while up to 94% of Cubans live in extreme poverty.

Miami Herald,  October 21, 2026

Cuba is, again, drumming up opposition to U.S. embargo. It’s all based on lies

By Roberto González
 On Oct. 28, the United Nations General Assembly is set to vote once again on Cuba’s resolution condemning the American embargo, and it will likely pass. Last year, the resolution passed 165 to 7, with 12 abstentions. It has passed every year for more than three decades, always on the same premise: that Cuba is poor because Washington made it so.
In early September, Cuba’s foreign minister, Bruno Rodríguez, said that, by his regime’s count, the embargo had cost Cuba $8 billion in the year through February. What Havana lies about, as it has for more than 60 years, is the cause.
Cuba is poor because it is not free. That formulation belongs to the late Ghanaian economist George Ayittey, who wrote that “Africa is poor because she is not free.” Cuba is a fully authoritarian, one-party state in which the Communist Party controls the state, the economy and public life. The party owns the economy and plans it from Havana. Private enterprise, which produces about 60% of output in places like China and Vietnam, is estimated to account for roughly 9% in Cuba, according to a 2023 report.
Granted, the embargo is not toothless. American farmers may sell to Cuba only for cash, without U.S. credit, and ordinary tourism remains banned. This year, Washington has squeezed the island’s fuel supply and, in May, exposed foreign companies in its energy and financial sectors to sanctions.
But it is not the siege Havana’s propaganda describes, and it has not stopped American food from reaching Cuba. Under this embargo, the United States became in 2024 the largest single-country supplier of Cuba’s imported food, and American goods exports to the island topped $876 million through August. A study in September’s Journal of Development Economics concluded that the embargo “hurt, but it was of secondary importance” in Cuba’s long decline.
So why is Cuba so poor? Because it has no way to correct its mistakes. Cuba’s 2019 constitution names the Communist Party “the superior driving force of the society and the State” and makes the mass media socialist property. No newspaper can expose a disastrous policy, no party can campaign against it, and no election can replace the leaders who chose it.
The pattern is old. In 1970, Fidel Castro promised a sugar harvest of 10 million tons, sent nearly half a million unpaid “volunteers” into the cane fields and fell short. In a democracy, a failure on that scale brings down a government. Castro stayed in power for nearly four more decades.
The planners haven’t changed much. In 2024, with hotel occupancy down to 23%, they still put 37.4% of the state’s investment into hotels and real estate and only 2.7% into agriculture — in a country that rations food — Cuban independent news outlet 14ymedio reported. Nobody was fired for it, because nobody was allowed to ask.
Then there is the money Cubans never see. Leaked documents reported by the Miami Herald show GAESA, the military’s business empire, holding as much as $18 billion in liquid assets. That would go a long way toward buying the medicine and repairing the power grid that Havana says the embargo keeps from Cubans. The money sits with the generals instead. In 2024, Cuba’s comptroller said her office could not audit it. Two months later, she was out.
For Cubans who object, the regime keeps two answers: a cell or a one-way ticket. Prisoners Defenders counted a record 1,339 political prisoners at the end of August. Others have left. By the regime’s own count, the population has shrunk 16% since 2017.
Cubans keep their own record, from the cane fields of 1970 to the blacked-out apartments of this fall. The General Assembly’s vote will not lift the embargo, but it will once again put the world’s name behind Havana’s favorite alibi for what it has done to Cubans. The embargo gets a vote every year. Cuba’s communist system has never faced a free one.

The Washington Times, August 26, 2025

Sanctions against Cuba work

Humanitarian corridor would aid Cubans, not the kleptocrats oppressing them

By John Suarez – Tuesday, August 26, 2025

Cuba’s kleptocratic military junta, with billions of dollars in cash reserves, pleads penury while Cubans living in extreme poverty die because of a lack of lifesaving medications. Meanwhile, regime elites live the good life, visiting Europe and the United States.

Through its conglomerate GAESA, the Cuban dictatorship’s military has $18 billion in bank accounts, more than the foreign reserves of Costa Rica, Uruguay and Panama.

Eighty-nine percent of the Cuban population lives in extreme poverty. Although the Cuban regime claims it has no money, Cubans die, and the government uses the misery it has manufactured on the island to sell the lie. This includes a failure to purchase lifesaving drugs.

Reports that emerged in 2024 show approximately 146 patients dying daily in Cuba because of a lack of such medications. Government pharmacies have a shortage of 63 key pharmaceuticals, yet keeping these essential drugs available to Cubans would cost only $43 million annually.

Extreme poverty rates in Costa Rica, Uruguay and Panama are far lower than those recorded in Cuba. Costa Rica has an extreme poverty rate of 1.3%, Uruguay’s is 0.2% and Panama’s is 3.7%, according to Our World in Data. Uruguay is doing substantially better than even the United States, which has a 1.2% rate of extreme poverty.

Extreme poverty coincides with the absence of the rule of law

What is the difference between these three Latin American countries and Cuba? The main one is the rule of law index, on which Cuba does not even register. Other Latin American countries, despite challenges, have democratic institutions, including independent judiciaries. This has been absent in Cuba since 1959.

From 1899 to 1959, Cuba had an independent supreme court. Over half a century, Cuba developed a multiparty system, competitive elections, a free press, a modern public health system and a strong labor movement. From 1902 to 1952, 17 Cuban presidents were elected in multiparty elections. This resulted in socioeconomic achievements that placed pre-1959 Cuba at the top of Latin American indexes, outperforming Castro’s Cuba.

Cuban democracy ended on March 10, 1952, when Fulgencio Batista disrupted the constitutional order. Nevertheless, the judiciary maintained independence.

Fidel Castro vowed to restore democracy and condemned Batista’s dictatorship. Instead, once in power, Castro imposed a communist dictatorship. (Before assuming power, he worked with the KGB to establish a police state.)

Rule of law versus rule by law

At the start of the Cuban revolution, Castro abolished the rule of law — a system by which laws are independently decided, equally enforced, publicly disseminated and compliant with international human rights standards — and replaced it with “rule by law,” which considers the governing authorities to be above the law, with the authority to enact and execute laws as they see fit, regardless of the impact on people’s larger liberties.

In their 2006 monograph on corruption in Cuba, Sergio Diaz-Briquetz and Jorge Perez-Lopez cited the formula “Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability.” The communist dictatorship in Cuba has monopoly control over all aspects of life, and the military dictatorship has total discretion over how to allocate resources — and zero accountability.

Cuba’s regime is a kleptocracy

Cuba, under the Castro regime, is a kleptocracy. It is organized corruption on a grand scale, done by political leaders for their personal enrichment and maintenance of power. This is why they use front people connected to regime elites to run “private” businesses.

Havana also plunders the resources of other countries, including Venezuela. It infiltrates governing structures and transnational criminal networks to enrich itself and pursue ideological objectives to export its political model.

“In many respects, Cuba can be accurately characterized as a violent criminal organization masquerading as a government,” former Defense Intelligence Agency Officer Christopher Simmons testified to Congress in 2012.

The positive role of sanctions

Loosening U.S. sanctions and providing this criminal enterprise with more resources has resulted in subjugation, first of the Nicaraguan people in 1979, during the Carter administration, and then of the Venezuelan people in 1999, during the Clinton administration.

Hard-line policies during the Reagan-Bush years brought a democratic renaissance to Nicaragua under Violeta Chamorro in 1990, reducing Havana’s negative influence in Latin America and coinciding with a democratic wave in the region.

President Obama’s December 2014 thaw coincided with the expansion in subsequent years of the Cuban military’s control of the Cuban economy. Havana also successfully assisted Daniel Ortega’s return to power and Nicaragua’s becoming a “full-blown dictatorship” from 2014 to 2016, despite Washington maintaining a free trade agreement with Managua.

History demonstrates that sanctions work to constrain Havana’s ambitions and protect U.S. taxpayers. That’s why the Center for a Free Cuba, along with other individuals and groups, continues to argue for a humanitarian corridor to directly assist Cubans on the island while not benefiting the kleptocrats who oppress them.

• John Suarez is a human rights activist and executive director of the Center for a Free Cuba and a former program officer for Latin America Programs at Freedom House.

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2025/aug/26/sanctions–cuba–work/

 

Miami Herald, August 6, 2021

Analysis: Once again, Cuba blames the US embargo for its domestic problems. It’s not that simple

By Nora Gamez Torres, Miami Herald
On the evening of Aug. 6, 1994, Fidel Castro appeared on state television after a rare anti-government protest erupted in Havana. The country was going through the worst of the severe economic crisis that followed the end of subsidies from the collapsed Soviet Union. He asked the population to tolerate all kinds of scarcities in the name of the revolution while he resisted desperately needed economic reforms. That night he had a two-word response to the question, “What do you believe is the fundamental reason behind the recent events?”
His answer: “El bloqueo.” The blockade — the Cuban phrase for the U.S. economic embargo.

Twenty-seven years later, Castro is gone, the economy is again in shambles and, unsurprisingly, the Cuban government once again blames the U.S. embargo for the recent widespread protests that shook the island. It is a strategy that Cubans know well. For decades, the government has blamed most of its own shortcomings on what it calls the “murderous criminal blockade” — everything from lack of food to lack of furniture in libraries to lack of insulin for diabetics.

The embargo has been used time and again by the Cuban government to obscure what Cubans on the island, in turn, call “the internal blockade” — the economic and political restrictions imposed by the Communist Party with the support of an extensive military and security apparatus.

After the July 11 demonstrations, pro-government activists and leftist organizations like Black Lives Matter have amplified the Cuban government’s claim that the U.S. embargo is the sole or primary cause of the street demonstrations. Latin American leftist governments like Mexico and Bolivia joined the denunciations and sent humanitarian aid to the island.

But the reality is that while the embargo does have some effect on the island’s economy and the population, it is not the principal reason the country’s economy is in tatters nor the reason Cubans took to the streets. They were, by their own accounts, fed up with the lack of food, the electrical blackouts and “the misery” in general, and they called for “a change of system.” It was the failure of Cuba’s centralized socialist economy, decades of government mismanagement and the lack of civil and political liberties that pushed thousands across the island to call for “the end of the dictatorship” and “freedom.”

While unprecedented, the protests were not entirely surprising, since the life of ordinary Cubans has significantly deteriorated after top leader Miguel Díaz-Canel was handpicked by Raul Castro to become his successor.

“There were clear signs of a growing social unrest and the policy responses of the Cuban elites to the growing inequality were regressive. The protests were also a cry of the Cuban families that have to put up with so much scarcity,” said sociologist Elaine Acosta, a research fellow at the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University.
The country was already in recession when the coronavirus pandemic hit and plunged the economy into its worst contraction since the so-called “Special Period’ in the 1990s after the end of Soviet subsidies. Dwindling aid from Venezuela and sanctions by the Trump administration to deprive the Cuban regime of revenue linked to remittances, travel and tourism also contributed to the economic crisis.
But what makes Cuba’s economy so sensitive to financial and political decisions made overseas is its own chronic lack of productivity. After six decades of socialist centralization, the country still does not produce enough to feed its population. Farmers can not freely cultivate and sell their crops. Its fishing fleets — and individual fishermen — are not allowed to sell fish, as the Center for a Free Cuba recently reminded readers in its response to a paid advertisement that appeared in the New York Times with the title “Let Cuba Live!” The Center titled its retort: “Let Cubans fish!”

The government has resisted liberalizing the economy even as most economic indicators, including industrial and agricultural production and the sugar harvest, Cuba’s prime export for centuries, plummeted. Instead, the government tightened its grip on freedom of expression through new decrees and took drastic measures to cut spending: It eliminated food subsidies, reduced the social assistance network and cut the public health system’s budget. It also slashed imports, leading to shortages of food, medicines, and other basic needs.

One thing was clear in the hundreds of videos that surfaced on social media of the massive anti-government uprising on the island: Not a single one showed anyone protesting against the embargo. The wrath of the protesters was aimed at the regime itself and its leaders, particularly Díaz-Canel.

“I did not hear anyone marching to remove the embargo. They were asking for freedom,” said independent journalist and longtime dissident Miriam Celaya in a phone interview from Havana. A supporter of Cuba’s engagement with the U.S., she sat next to President Barack Obama during his historic meeting with Cuban dissidents in Havana in 2015.
 “Historically, I have spoken out against the embargo and against its being used to cover up all the human rights abuses,” she said. “To link the embargo to the protests seems to me to be tremendous opportunism.”
It is not that Cubans do not acknowledge that the embargo makes things more difficult for the Cuban government, and hence for them too, as the state owns and manages all food stores, hospitals, schools and many other services such as electricity and water. But they criticize how Cuban leaders have used it as a scapegoat for everything that goes wrong on the island.
“The embargo is real, but the regime has used it so vaguely to justify almost all problems in Cuba that it has rendered it meaningless,” tweeted the young Cuban actor Daniel Triana.
 
No ban on food or medicine 
The embargo has little to do with how the Communist Party chooses to run the island’s centralized economy or why it curtails the rights of its citizens. And some of the claims made by the Cuban government and its defenders — for example, that Cuba can’t buy food or medicines from U.S. companies — are simply not true.
The six-decade-old policy does restrict some U.S. trade, travel and financial transactions with Cuba.  It is not designed to last forever: the president of the United States can lift it when a democratic government is elected on the island.
‘As a general rule, the embargo prohibits all U.S. transactions involving the Cuban government or persons living in Cuba, unless explicitly authorized by the U.S. Treasury Department regulations or by law. Cuba is banned from using the U.S. financial system and there are currently no direct banking relations between the two countries. Other restrictions make it more difficult for the island to acquire goods overseas that have more than 10 percent American-made components.
But the embargo does not prevent Cuba from trading with other countries, and just like Americans, Cubans could buy South Korean Samsung TVs or Japanese Toyotas — but the prices in the government stores are well beyond the average worker’s reach, which has nothing to do with the embargo. The TV goes for $1,139 and the car for $80,000, while the country’s monthly minimum state wage is the equivalent of $88.
Because of the importance of the U.S. financial system globally, restrictions on transactions with Cuba may also affect foreign companies. Some companies simply choose not to trade with Cuba, fearing running afoul of U.S. law. But at the same time, the embargo has been compared to a block of Swiss cheese because of its many holes.
Contrary to Cuban government propaganda, there is no ban on selling food and medicines or telecommunication services to Cuba. In fact, most of the chicken that Cubans eat, for example, comes from the United States.
The embargo does require Cuba to pay upfront for food, without financing from U.S. companies. The requirement, however, hasn’t prevented Cuba from buying millions of dollars’ worth of food from the U.S. every year. In 2020, Cuba bought $157 million in chicken, grains and even toilet paper, and the U.S. ranked third as the island’s trading partner for agricultural imports, just below the European Union and Brazil and well ahead of China, according to a May report by the Congressional Research Service.

The embargo regulations also authorize transactions related to humanitarian needs or designed to directly benefit the Cuban people, such as medical and health-related projects, disaster preparedness, or environmental concerns, among others. American companies are also allowed to help improve Cuba’s crumbled infrastructure in key areas such as public transportation, water management, public housing, health and education, but these are not opportunities that the island’s government makes public.

Americans can donate food, medicines and medical supplies, communication devices and other items to people on the island, but it is not a straightforward process. The communist government has the last word about what actually gets into the country and usually blocks aid sent by the U.S. government or Cuban exiles. And on the U.S. side, organizations and activists that send aid to Cuba complain about the “red tape” and lack of clear guidance.

The embargo allows the export of U.S. medicines and medical supplies to the island, but the process can be cumbersome, requiring licenses and guarantees that they will go to the Cuban people, not the government. That might explain why, since 2003, the Cuban government has bought the relatively small sum of $26.3 million in American healthcare products including insulin, penicillin, laboratory reagents, ultrasonic scanning equipment, artificial limbs and other medical appliances, according to data gathered by the US-Cuba Trade and Economic Council.
While selling or donating medical supplies is possible, several organizations, including the Cuba Study Group and the Center for Democracy in the Americas, are asking the Biden administration to suspend the bureaucratic requirements to speed up the process citing the humanitarian emergency caused by the coronavirus pandemic in Cuba.
The Cuban government has recently complained that U.S. sanctions have made it difficult to buy syringes for its vaccination campaign. But it’s hard to pinpoint exactly whether the main problem is the embargo or simply market forces and Cuba’s unwillingness to pay higher prices or find sources of credit.
Cuba did eventually receive 1.7 million syringes donated through New York-based Global Health Partners, which coordinated a campaign to raise funds to send at least 6 million syringes to the island. According to executive director Bob Schwartz, the U.S. sanctions created difficulties in obtaining syringes and in finding a shipping company willing to deliver them.
But market forces and a lack of supply worldwide also played a part in the island’s syringe troubles. That led manufacturers to favor orders from larger countries that are not under any U.S.-imposed restrictions, said Medea Benjamin, co-founder of CODEPINK, a leftist organization that has supported the Cuban government over the years and also coordinated the campaign Let Cuba Live!
“Demand was so great that manufacturers didn’t want to bother with a relatively small order for Cuba in addition to having to navigate the banking system and facing the risk of retaliation by the U.S.,” she said.
 
Separating fact from fiction 
The complexity of embargo regulations makes it difficult to separate fact from propaganda, and the policy debate is filled with half-truths.
Some of the claims made by the Cuban government about the effects of the embargo over the years are based on reality — for example, that the sanctions have prevented Cuba from acquiring new jetliners. But other claims are based on dubious calculations on how much money Cuba would have saved if it could trade freely with the U.S. A third class of claims are based on fictitious calculations of “losses” because Cuba cannot sell its products like organic produce or software in the U.S. Many other claims are manipulations of the facts or outright falsehoods, like saying the embargo does not allow the country to buy grain seeds in the U.S. It does, and Cuba has purchased them over the years.

Ultimately, the island’s government has successfully managed to find ways around the embargo and buy American goods, skirting the financial restrictions, by building an extensive web of offshore companies in Panama, Luxembourg, and Liechtenstein, as investigations by the Miami Herald and McClatchy have uncovered.

https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article253117303.html