Archive for 1999

Lo que el Gobernador Ryan Debe Preguntarle a Fidel Castro

Sunday, October 24th, 1999

Chicago Tribune| 24 Octubre de 1999

Por Frank Calzón

Según el gobernador George Ryan, su visita a Cuba tiene que ver con su deseo de ayudar a los cubanos y de explorar la posibilidad de oportunidades comerciales para las empresas de su estado, Illinois.

Fidel Castro se comportará como el anfitrión perfecto: amable y locuaz. Castro le hablará a Ryan sobre la economía cubana, sobre las oportunidades únicas de inversión en la isla, y sobre sus muchos logros en cuarenta años al mando. Si bien Castro culpará, sin duda, a los Estados Unidos por todos los problemas de Cuba, y presentará una imagen idílica de su revolución, no sería una transgresión protocolar por parte del gobernador Ryan hacerle a Castro unas cuantas preguntas.

Como por ejemplo: el gobernador Ryan puede preguntar cuándo se levantará la prohibición oficial que impide que los cubanos puedan disfrutar de los mismos hoteles y restaurantes que él y su comitiva van a disfrutar. Ryan también puede preguntar para qué fecha podrán los cubanos hablar libremente y expresar sus opiniones sobre las condiciones del país con sus vecinos, compañeros de escuela, de trabajo… y ¿por qué no? también con los funcionarios del gobierno.

Si a los cubanos les fuera permitido dialogar con Castro sin miedo a represalias; si las madres de los presos políticos pudiesen entrevistarse con las autoridades; si los periodistas cubanos tuviesen la oportunidad de cuestionar la política oficial como se hace en la prensa norteamericana… ¿Qué preguntarían los cubanos?

Probablemente preguntarían que por qué, a pesar de las peticiones del Papa Juan Pablo II, la Iglesia cubana, y muchos países, Castro no ha puesto en libertad a sus prisioneros políticos. De seguro, los cubanos preguntarían por aquellos cubanos que Amnistía Internacional ha declarado Prisioneros de Conciencia, como Marta Beatriz Roque, Félix Bonne, Vladimiro Roca y René Gómez Manzano. Los cuatro cumplen diversas sentencias por la osadía de escribir un documento titulado “La Patria es de todos” donde se plantea con gran cordura que debe realizarse un diálogo nacional para la transición hacia la democracia. Sería apropiado instar al presidente cubano a que responda la acusación de Amnistía Internacional sobre cómo a los presos políticos se les retiene las medicinas como castigo.

Pero los cubanos no van a recibir respuesta alguna de un gobierno que en el fondo desprecia a la ciudadanía. Castro afirma que todos los cubanos son iguales, pero como bien señaló George Orwell, hay gente que es “más igual” que otra en los regímenes totalitarios. La nomenclatura cubana, los miembros del Partido Comunista, y los oficiales de Seguridad del Estado gozan de un nivel de vida muy superior al del cubano promedio. Obras como “La granja” del propio Orwell, que señalan las injusticias de los sistemas como el cubano, se consideran subversivas y están prohibidas por el gobierno.

Después de cuarenta años de socialismo, a Castro se le ha ocurrido implementar un sistema degradante de apartheid turístico que le prohibe a los cubanos entrar en los hoteles, playas, tiendas, restaurantes y -lo que es más grave- en los hospitales designados sólo para extrajeros. El régimen afirma que el embargo norteamericano hace imposible que se puedan ofrecer estos servicios al pueblo. Tales impugnaciones no son ni remotamente creíbles, ya que Servimed, la agencia oficial cubana responsable de promover el “turismo de salud”, no carece del más mínimo recurso a diez años del colapso de los subsidios soviéticos a Cuba.

Según la guía turística francesa Ulysee, “los mejores hospitales y clínicas están disponibles al turista; se paga en dólares y el servicio médico es excelente y rápido”. ¡Si tan solo el cubano tuviera la suerte de recibir una atención parecida!

Castro responsabiliza al embargo por el racionamiento. Pero Cuba es una isla tropical de suelo fértil y abundante lluvia, rodeada de un mar privilegiado. Sin embargo, el racionamiento de comestibles sigue en pie, incluyendo productos autóctonos como el mango, los plátanos, los vegetales y el pescado. Para los polacos, checos y rusos, ésta es una situación muy familiar; pero al menos ellos tuvieron la suerte de que la carestía cesara rápidamente al colapso del comunismo que puso fin a la tradicional ineficiencia de su política agrícola.

Mientras Cuba fue parte de la esfera soviética, recibió más asistencia de la antigua URSS – y por más tiempo-, que la mayoría de los países de Europa Occidental durante el Plan Marshall que se implementó al final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Sin embargo, ahora que el régimen comunista todavía ocupa el poder, a los cubanos le gustaría saber a dónde fueron a parar los miles de millones de dólares en subsidios soviéticos que Cuba recibió durante tres décadas.

¿Y qué de los derechos laborales? ¿Por qué se le permite a una compañía extranjera invertir en Cuba, cuando a los propios cubanos no se les permite la gestión empresarial privada? Por ejemplo, el gobierno multa y clausura los “paladares” – los pequeños restaurantes en casas particulares – si acomodan a más de doce personas. Alguna gente en Illinois podrá pensar que el impacto del comercio y del contacto personal ha de ser favorable. Pero lo cierto es que a las compañías extranjeras les ha interesado promover la justicia y la libertad en Cuba lo mismo que a sus contrapartes americanas durante la dictadura de Fulgencio Batista. A éstos, al igual que a aquéllos, les importa un bledo.

Por ejemplo, la compañía Sheritt, el conglomerado minero canadiense, le paga a Castro $9,500 dólares al año por cada trabajador que emplea. El trabajador recibe del gobierno un salario en pesos cubanos que equivale a entre $20 y $38 dólares mensuales. ¿Le preguntará el gobernador Ryan a Castro que le explique qué le sucedería a un obrero cubano que se atreva a proponer un sindicato independiente? ¿O qué le sucedería a los trabajadores que protesten por los daños al medioambiente causados por las prácticas del “capitalismo salvaje” de los inversionistas que operan sin los controles de un estado de derecho o la vigilancia de una prensa independiente? No, el gobernador Ryan probablemente no se lo preguntará.

El gobernador Ryan también puede indagar sobre el uso del electroshock y el internamiento obligado en los manicomios de Cuba de disidentes políticos que están perfectamente cuerdos, una práctica importada durante el largo período de relaciones con los soviéticos. Como bien ha dicho Vladimir Bukovsky, el célebre activista ruso de derechos humanos: “En el transcurso de una sola generación, Cuba pasó de la etapa de ‘justicia revolucionaria’ a la de ‘legado socialista’; de la práctica de liquidar a los ‘enemigos de clase’ a la de ‘re-educación política’ y ‘tratamiento siquiátrico con los apáticos al socialismo’”.

Hay otras preguntas que los invitados de Illinois no le harán a Castro, su anfitrión. Puede que vivan demasiado lejos de Cuba para entender su verdadera tragedia. Pero los cubanos se acordarán de todo. Los cubanos se acordarán de aquéllos que explotaron su miseria. Y si por casualidad a alquien se le ocurre preguntarle a Castro sobre su responsabilidad por las actuales condiciones que padece su país, los cubanos se acordarán siempre de aquéllos que hicieron las preguntas que el propio pueblo no podía pronunciar.

Those Men in Havana Are Now Chinese

Friday, July 30th, 1999

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
by Jaime Suchlicki

In February, a top-level Chinese military delegation, led by Defense Minister Chi Haotian, visited Cuba. It was the first time a Chinese minister of defense had been to the island. But in terms of recent Cuba?China relations, it was not a rare exchange. In fact, after a prolonged period of tension, the two countries have been warming up to each other in an unprecedented fashion.

In 1993, President Jiang Zemin visited Cuba and Fidel Castro reciprocated by visiting China in 1995. Within the past two years, Cuba and China have exchanged high-level military and civilian delegations, including visits by Raul Castro and Cuba’s top generals to China and a trip to Cuba by General Dong Liang Ju, head of the Chinese Military Commission. China has become increasingly vocal in its opposition to the US’s Cuba policy, particularly the embargo, and Cuba condemned last month’s accidental NATO attack on the Chinese embassy as “an act of aggression, a genocidal action” by the US. As the US debates the value of the Cuba embargo and as questions continue to arise in Congress about President Clinton’s dealing with the Chinese, the China-Cuba nexus is of more than passing interest.

The impoverished island obviously can offer little attraction to China in economic terms. The logical conclusion from the military visits and other clues is that China sees a presence in Cuba of some strategic value, just as the Soviet Union did years ago when it first teamed up with Fidel Castro to make Cuba a Soviet military base and intelligence?gathering center. A US administration official, who asked not to be identified, says that “the US is tracking very closely Chinese activities in Cuba. As closely as we can.”

Fidel Castro’s relations with China have a volatile history. When Maoist China and the Soviet Union parted company in the 1960s, Castro chose to stick with the Soviets, who seemed to offer better support and a better payoff for his efforts to spread revolution throughout Latin America. This soured Cuba’s relations with China. At the Summit Conference of the Non?Aligned Movement in Havana in 1979, Castro attacked the Chinese and the US as two “archenemies” of the developing world and ridiculed Deng Xiaoping as a “numbskull” and a “puppet.”
Despite this baggage, relations improved somewhat when Chinese?Soviet relations warmed under Mr. Gorbachev. The ?collapse of the Soviet Union and Castro’s desperate need for economic and military aid allowed China to step in the political vacuum left by the Soviets.
There can be little doubt about what Cuba wants from China: economic aid in the form of trade and investment from a partner that couldn’t be less interested in human rights. That aid has been going to the island since the 1980s. The first approaches were made on the trade front when Cuba’s foreign trade minister Ricardo Cabrisas visited China and signed several agreements that increased bilateral commerce from $220 million in 1983 to $426 million by 1989.

But the more intriguing question is what does China want from Cuba? Due to Cuba’s economic problems, bilateral trade with China has decreased in the 1990s, falling to $256 million by 1997, the latest year for which data is available. But Chinese investment has picked up steam in the last few years. Some of it, including a bicycle factory, is consumer oriented. But other spending suggests a strategic interest. Western intelligence sources say that China is putting money into Cuban military telecommunications (and possibly biotechnology); as only one example, it is investing in the Terrena aribe Satellite Tracking Base. At the February 1999 meeting with Castro in Havana, Defense Minister Chi Haotian emphasized that relations between the Chinese and Cuban armies have seen “fairly rapid development.”

The reasons for China’s military bonding with Cuba are not immediately obvious. Chinese sales of weapons to Cuba are insignificant, reportedly involving some MiG aircraft parts and other low?value items. Cuba’s potential for becoming a major purchaser of weapons or a +major trading partner is small. But evidence is mounting that China’s main interest in Cuba is not dissimilar to a use that attracted the Soviets to the island: It is an ideal spot for electronic eavesdropping on communications on the American mainland?in other words, a good base for spying. It also is a useful relay point for routing intelligence back home, which is what the Soviets used it for back in the Cold War days.

There’s no doubt about Chinese involvement in Cuban communications. In May, a radio station in Cuba began re?broadcasting Chinese information and news from Cuba to Latin America. Radio Marti, a US?government?funded station that beams short-wave radio broadcasts to Cuba, has meanwhile found itself subject to more intense Cuban jamming, according to a reliable source. It is suspected that China is aiding the Cuban effort to drown out Radio Marti.

Of greater interest is Chinese listening. Intelligence sources say that the 1970s Soviet electronic facility in Lourdes, near Havana, is still operational for monitoring US military and commercial communications. These sources also say that China using and improving Cuban capabilities in this area and moving to develop its own on the island. An internal May 13, 1999 US government ?memorandum claims that “China may have participated in the construction of a short?wave transmitting site” in Havana. The US administration official I spoke with said the US is aware of the rumors that China seeks to establish a signals collection facility on the island, “but we are not aware of any evidence that such a facility exists.” Richard Baum, UCLA professor of political science and China expert, points out that an electronic collection facility in Cuba “would fit with Chinese electronic warfare priorities and ,objectives.”

After the release of the congressional “Cox report” detailing Chinese espionage at a US nuclear laboratory, it is hardly a secret that the Chinese are operating an extensive spy network in the Western hemisphere. So it should be no further surprise that the Chinese might want an electronic espionage base close to American shores. China is not in the same league as the Soviets were in the 1960s or 70s, but the People’s Liberation Army hardly regards itself as a friend of the West. If it were, it would not have engaged in such potentially destabilizing practices as shipping advanced weapons to the Syrians and the Iranians.

Indeed, Chinese foreign policy is patient and farsighted. In Cuba, the Chinese seem to be taking a calculated gamble: that the US’s complex relations with and economic interests in China will prevent the Clinton administration from raising a big fuss over China’s activities in Cuba., They may well be right.
Mr. Suchlicki is director of the Institute of Cuban and Cuban?American Studies at the’ University of Miami and author of “Cuba: From. Columbus to Castro” Brasseus. 1997

Canada Should Start Calling the Shots in Cuba

Tuesday, July 27th, 1999

THE GLOBE AND MAIL
by Susan Kaufman Purcell

And a good place to start would be to adopt the same business principles as it did in South Africa. If apartheid against
blacks in South Africa was unacceptable to Canadians; apartheid against Cubans should be unacceptable in Cuba. After years of constructive engagement with the government of Fidel Castro, Ottawa recently acknowledged that Cuba’s human?rights performance has not improved. Nor has the Cuban government become more democratic. This does not mean that Canada will now join the United States’ economic embargo against the island, since Washington’s policy has also failed to achieve these goals.

Instead, Canada will undoubtedly seek new ways to make its preferred policy of engagement work better. A good place to begin is in the area of foreign investment, where Canada accepted restrictions on the behaviour of foreign investors that helped strengthen the regime to the detriment of citizens seeking freedom from state control.

Canada allowed its companies to invest in Cuba despite the fact that Cubans are barred from doing so. Nor can Cubans frequent hotels managed by Canadians and other foreigners. Finally, Canadian investors agreed to relinquish their right to hire Cuban workers directly. Instead, they allowed the Cuban government to get job applicants for their loyalty to the Castro regime. Unsurprisingly, only politically safe workers were awarded jobs with foreign companies.

Canadian investors also agreed to pay wages, in hard currency, to the Cuban government, which then compensated the workers in pesos. The catch was that the conversion rate was the government?declared rate of one peso to the dollar, rather than the market rate of 23 pesos to one US dollar. As a result, the bulk of the money that Canadian companies earmarked for their Cuban workers flowed into government coffers. It is easy to understand why Fidel Castro imposed these rules. For him, the challenge was to obtain foreign capital without importing capitalism. There are several reasons why he dislikes capitalism, but the most relevant one here is that it as the capacity to create wealth that is not under state control. Many political systems have started collapsing when new economic elites were denied political power commensurate with their economic power. The restrictions imposed by the Cuban leader therefore ensured that Cubans employed by foreigners would remain dependent on the government for their jobs.

A harder question to answer is why Canada accepted these rules. One possibility is that Ottawa believed that eventually the Canadian government could renegotiate the rules of the game, on the assumption that by then Cuba would have become dependent on foreign ?capital. In the meantime, the ability of Canadian
companies to operate in a market from which their US competitors were excluded was undoubtedly appealing. Perhaps Ottawa also believed that the mere presence of foreigners in Cuba would ex pose Cubans to the outside world, causing them to demand, and ultimately get, more political power and respect for their human rights.

It is now clear that these assumptions were incorrect. Maintaining political control has always been Castro’s top priority, even if it has been at the expense of economic growth. In addition, contact with foreigners has proved most effective in bringing about democratic change in countries where at least some groups are already independent of the government. Cuba, which lacks independent labour unions, a free press and a private sector of any consequence, is not such a country. Canada should not abandon its policy of constructive engagement toward Cuba.

Instead, Ottawa needs to put more emphasis on the word “constructive.” Until now, only Mr. Castro has set conditions on the behaviour of Canadian and other foreign companies. It is time for Canada to lay down some conditions of its own. The constructive? engagement policy pursued with the white government of South Africa can serve as a model. There, Canadian and other foreign companies subscribed to a set of business principles, known as the Sullivan principles, that held foreign companies investing in South Africa to a higher standard of behaviour than those practiced by the South African government. One example: Foreign companies agreed to treat black and white employees equally.

Canada should adopt the spirit of these principles and insist on the right of its companies operating in Cuba to hire and pay their Cuban workers directly, either in hard currency or in pesos at a market determined exchange rate. Canadian companies managing hotels in Cuba should also insist that Cubans be allowed to frequent them. If apartheid against blacks in South Africa was unacceptable to Canadians, apartheid against Cubans should be unacceptable in Cuba.

Canada today has an opportunity to re?fashion its Cuba policy so that it more accurately reflects Canada’s values and goals. If it does so, other countries might follow suit and the policy of constructive engagement would gain new credibility.
Susan Kaufman Purcell is vice president of the Council of the Americas and the Americas’ Society in New York.